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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Am. J. Th.* = *The American Journal of Theology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Deception and Reality. A. KIRSCHMANN. Am. J. Ps., XIV, 3–4, pp. 24–41.

The question: What is reality? is not a legitimate one; it is in itself a vicious circle. We are in the midst of realities and the question that confronts us is: Is there anything unreal and what is unreal? The notion that the senses deceive us is a mistaken one: the senses cannot deceive us, but our interpretation of what they give us is often incorrect. Certainty is confined to mathematical relations and to the actual, the present, content of consciousness. The perceptions in dreams, hallucinations, and optical illusions are as 'real' as those of ordinary life; their 'deception' depends on the interpretation we put upon them. The reality of an impression obviously cannot be based on the reality of the object to which it is referred. We can have certain knowledge only about what takes place in our own consciousness, but there is an unlimited sphere of *belief.* The terms 'real' and 'reality' are used ambiguously; all states of consciousness are real, but there are different kinds of reality. A memory image is as real as a perception, but in a different sense. The term 'Realism' is always misleading; for it suggests an opposite contrary to the real, and no such opposite is possible. But if you identify the real with the true, then the opposite of truth, lying, may be called unreal; but what is unreal here is still the meaning attributed to the action or words, and not the action or words as states of consciousness. The lie or untruth or unreal is never a matter of fact but a matter of interpretation. There can be nothing unreal but the product of a human lie, and hence nothing unreal without the will to produce such by lying. If we should never lie, there would be no error. Even errors in a mathematical deduction reduce to statements that some-thing is certain or necessary which is not so. Error is so universal because men are unwilling to admit the narrowness of their knowledge, and insist on substituting the agreeable for the true. Objectivity consists in adherence to subjective truth. On the ethical side, the only sound principle is to have no principles but to act according to the sense of truth. As for pedagogy, we should have no positive ideals of education. The best method is negative and preventative,—the elimination of falsehood and error. This involves the cultivation of originality. Education to perfect truthfulness is the only pedagogical ideal we can admit; the real may safely be left to nature. C. E. GALLOWAY.

Die Grundlagen der modernen Physik und ihre Beziehung zu den neuesten Ergebnissen der Forschung. W. WIEN. Deutsche Revue, XXIX, 1, pp. 39–51.

Physicists of the last generation were fully convinced that such scientific generalizātions as the laws of the conservation of energy and the persistence of matter were ultimate and universally valid propositions. This point has become a matter of doubt, however, among scientists of the present, especially as a result of the discovery of the Roentgen rays and the more recent discovery of the radio-active substances. Some of the emanations from these substances seem to be composed of particles whose mass cannot be more than one thousandth that of a hydrogen atom, and whose velocity is so great that the usual formula for kinetic energy ($E = \frac{1}{2}MV^2$) seems not to hold. Already it has been suggested that the concept of electric charge can be substituted for that of mass, thus reducing mechanics to a branch of electromagnetism. For epistemology, these results are not less important than for science. They seem to show that our so-called laws of nature are merely pictures which we make to represent nature, and which depend on inner logical relationships as much as on external facts. They are not ultimate, but mere approximations to the truth which science is continually approaching. G. H. SABINE.

De la verité: remarques logiques. A. NAVILLE. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 5, pp. 449–461.

True and truth are used in many senses. The ordinary logical definition, however, is the agreement of thought with its object, its resemblance to such object. "The mind of the scientist should be a mirror of the world." To such a definition objection arises. Thought, since the 'object' must itself be thought, can resemble only thought, not things. Even in the mental and moral realm, the objection holds good; in the mind of the observer psychological states cannot be reproduced. Accordingly, there are two kinds of truth, relative and absolute, the former being the relation between object and perception, the latter that arising between perception and remembered image. The one is of sensation; the other of thought. Error in the former case consists in the observer not being in the most favorable circumstances for scrutiny. What, now, are the criteria of truth? Sigwart distinguishes two, — necessity and universality. But these are not sufficient. Both in the physical and moral world one must add, "for the normal subject placed under normal conditions." Still, this does not bring satisfaction. The normal impression of the normal person is frequently, as in case of a stick held under water appearing broken, at fault.

ARTHUR J. TIETJE.

Energetik, Mechanik, und Leben. E. VON HARTMANN. Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr., CXXIV, 2, 128–154.

Energetics in its fundamental laws embraces only net results and leaves the precise mode and duration of the physical process undetermined. In a qualitative energetics — to which the several modes of energy are ultimate — the defect is irremediable; a non-qualitative energetics may remedy it by resort to molecular mechanics. If the constancy of energy in each axis of tri-dimensional space be granted, an adequate mechanical energetics is possible; but this principle is derivable from that of the conservation of energy, only on the supposition that all forces are energetic. There may, however, be non-energetic, uncentered forces, the lines of whose simultaneous manifestations do not meet in a point; which have no definite position in space, so that potential energy has no meaning in connection with them; and which can never give rise to the appearance of matter. Non-energetic forces may be active in the turning of compound atoms or molecules, and in the displacement of the component parts of unstable chemical compounds. The assumption of such forces gives rise to an energetics that is adequate to the explanation of the phenomena of vital autonomy. The sole supremacy of mechanical laws is then restricted to inorganic nature; in organic nature they form the necessary groundwork upon which vital autonomy plays. The question is raised as to the relation of organic evolution to the law of the deterioration of energy. Plasm-organisms could only arise when the temperature of the earth's surface fell below the congealing point of albumen; they will cease to exist when it sinks permanently below the freezing-point of water. The increasing habitability of the earth is followed by a higher and higher biological evolution. The lowest organisms are the first to come and the last to go, on account of their greater power of adaptation. In man the faculty of organic adaptation is least, and technical adaptation takes its place. Neither adaptation is without absolute limits. We may safely assume that as the conditions of life on the earth deteriorate, first the highest organisms, as soon as their improved arts cannot make good the loss of light and heat, will die out; then the lower; until finally the unicellular organisms will be left alone. The 'increase of psychical values' has thus its presumably certain limit. Even if other than plasm organisms — as flame or siliconorganisms — ever existed, they surely had their absolute limits also; and on the frozen earth that puts an end to plasm-organisms, no other kind will be physically possible. The possibility of life depends on three conditions: first, the absolute temperature; second, the conversion of chemical energy into and out of other forms of energy; third, a certain difference in the temperature of the sun and that of the earth. It may be objected, that the operation of the law of the deterioration of energy is asymptotic; but that means that within finite time it will pass the limits of possible life. What has been said presupposes the indefinite continuance of the physical laws involved. The possibility of the contrary supposition must not be lost sight of.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

Ueber die Entwickelung des Begriffs der höheren arithmologischen Gesetzmässigkeit in Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. W. G. ALEXEJEFF. V. f. w. Ph., XXVIII, 1, pp. 73–92.

G. Teichmüller first applied the mathematical concept of discontinuity (*Unstetigkeit*) to biology and sociology in his criticism of Darwinism in 1877. He pointed out that continuity implied discreteness, and that, since plants and animals are not *sums* but *products* of factors having different functions, we must not expect to find their different forms connected by imperceptible changes. Alexander von Oettingen, in his *Moralstatistik*, has dwelt on the necessary correlation of the natural realm of necessity and the mental realm of freedom. N. W. Bugajew has recently shown the connection between mathematics and the modern science and philosophy. Quantitative changes may be independent or dependent, they may also be continuous or discontinuous; this last distinction divides mathematics into the two fields of *analysis* and *arithmology*. Analysis has reached an advanced stage of development in the differential and integral calculus; but arithmology, because of its greater complication, has not been so fully worked out. By the aid of analysis, mechanics, astronomy, mathematical physics, and finally physical chemistry have developed, and our modern point of view is on the whole analytical. This method applied to biology, psychology, and sociology, has issued in the attempted exclusion of teleology from nature. But such attempts ignore the ethical, aesthetic, and religious aspirations natural to man. The higher, arithmological point of view must be taken, and this will not exclude individuality and freedom, since it does not demand absolute continuity and invariability of phenomena, and mechanical interdependence of functions. The author points out different applications of arithmology in the theory of numbers, enumerative geometry, and the arithmization of algebraic functions. Modern chemistry, with its atomistic theory and periodic system, has abandoned the analytic tendency for the arithmological. The schematism of atomistic structure in chemistry, developed independently, is yet identical with the symbolic theory of algebraic invariants. The universalism of analysis must certainly yield to arithmological individualism in biology and sociology. Nekrassow shows that Quetelet, in his conception of the 'law of great numbers,' has disregarded the fact that an average applies only when the accidental phenomena of magnitude concerned are independent of one another. Since the law, however, yields verifiable results, a free teleological factor must be present, *isolating* human actions from one another. Human needs, not necessities, are constant. The theory of probabilities promises us more light here ; mathematics as a *whole* must assist our speculation.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

The Use and Abuse of Final Causes. G. E. UNDERHILL. Mind, 50, pp. 220–241.

Bacon's condemnation of final causes referred to the sciences of physics and chemistry, and threw no light on the significance of a teleological view in the biological sciences or in metaphysics. Spinoza regarded final causes as mere human illusions which sprang from a tendency to view the universe from the standpoint of man's convenience. Neither Spinoza nor Bacon had the biological conception of function as an end, but they were right in excluding the notion of final cause from mechanical explanations. Kant established the place of final causes in biology by drawing a distinction between external ends, or final cause as utility, and internal ends, or the functions which an organism is adapted to fulfill. The conception of internal final cause is of great value to biology, and, like any other methodological assumption, is justified by its success. It leads to an assumption of general purposiveness in nature, and of external ends in the relation of organism to environment, both of which are to be tested by their success as working hypotheses. Such assumptions, however, are drawn from the analogy with means and ends in deliberate human actions, and do not mean that nature is an intelligent cause working for preconceived ends. As to the metaphysical significance of this demand for final causes in biology, Kant argued to a rational faith in an intelligent cause, God. Further, he conceived man as, in his moral nature, independent of natural causes, and able to set for himself independent ends. He regarded man in this aspect as the supreme end of nature. Nature is the means of moral discipline, whereby man develops that power of setting ends to himself which constitutes him the highest end. Moral necessity also demands a cause outside nature which shall determine nature to that end, and postulates God as a rational Being who is guided by the idea of an end and who uses nature as means to it. Modern philosophy can better estimate the value of the conception of final cause than Bacon or Spinoza or Kant, having seen its success in biology. Like other principles which have been successful in making the world intelligible, final cause is no mere illusory hypothesis, but a constituent element in nature. Its successful scientific application is a most important piece of evidence for the unity of the active principle at work in nature and in man.

MARY WINIFRED SPRAGUE.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Binocular Vision and the Problem of Knowledge. J. H. HYSLOP. Am. J. Ps., XIV, 3-4, pp. 42-59.

The phenomena of binocular vision threw a new light on the problem of space perception, which the speculations of Berkeley and Kant had left in a very unsettled state. Wheatstone showed that the perception of solidity is associated with the existence of disparate images. This solidity is not present in the retina, though we may say it is represented there. In short, we see what is not in the impression. There is an organic function for the perception of solidity in vision without having this quale present in the image. Tactual and muscular space may well become associated with the visual quale, but this involves no identification of the tactual and muscular quale with the visual. The interpretation of 'experience,' association, and 'motor' phenomena, is indifferent to this conclusion. The phenomena of upright vision indicate that we see objects as they are without any identity between the image or impression and the object. That is to say, we may have objects of consciousness which are not 'in' consciousness, and perception may transcend the states and affections of the sensorium. This seems to establish the doctrine of realism in the problem of knowledge. But this discrepancy between the percept and impression is evidence that the quale is a purely mental construction, and it may be argued that therefore the entire percept is a construction of the mind. It remains true, however, that the ideal construction may correctly represent an objective fact, though it has a purely subjective genesis not in the impression. In the tendency of individuals to adjust themselves to their environment, we find evidence of a capacity of ideal action which would represent correctly the nature of objective reality; and, in the case of upright vision, the act of perception reports the objective fact and not the subjective.

C. E. GALLOWAY.

The Status of the Subconscious. J. JASTROW. Am. J. Ps., XIV, 3-4, pp. 79-89.

The subconscious presents itself in two aspects: as a subliminal activity which might be consciously recognized, and as an organized aggregate of such activities. The problem begins with subconscious sensations and the stimuli necessary to arouse them. The psychophysical process accompanying the existence of the imperceptible sensations is probably different only in degree from that which accompanies the perceptible. Thus there is no arbitrary boundary between the conscious and the subconscious, and the imperceptible impressions influence the behavior of consciousness. The activity of mind is broader than the account of it given by direct perception, and the meaning of the term 'consciousness' should be extended to cover the subconscious forms of psychical activity. The subvoluntary elements, which are real and typical factors of conduct, we refer to 'automatism' and 'habit.' This does not fully explain them but shows where an explanation must be sought. If we could explain memory and sensory and motor habit, the problem would be solved. Psychology is as intimately concerned with the subconscious as with the conscious, and all mental activities must be interpreted with reference to both phases of the psychic life.

C. E. GALLOWAY.

La conception générale de l' association des idées et les données de l'expérience. H. PIÉRON. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 5, pp. 493–517.

The current theory of the association of ideas has never been adequately refuted; experiment alone can truly reveal its fallacies. These are mainly four. To say that an idea always or even usually evokes a simple idea is false; frequently in the course of experiments the ideas evoked, especially in the case of introspective subjects, were highly complex and remote. Different persons, moreover, responded to the same inductive word with different associations (occasionally, as with a mentally idle invalid, with unintelligible ones, *e. g.*, philosophy — to sing, butter — to sleep, teeth — table); similarly, the same subjects, at different periods, and among different surroundings, answered with widely different associations. In the third place, hesitation, not merely at ambiguous inductive terms, such as *goutte*, but at very ordinary definite ones, such as *fumée*, was visible; in the last-mentioned instance the mind of the subject halted between pipe, cannon, chimney. Finally, the existence in the hypothetical idea-chain of gaps and reversions incontestably disproved the current theory. Negatively, then, the experiments have established that there is no fixed chain growing link by link; associations follow habits of mind, occupations, interests, sometimes nothing at all. Positively, results were not so good. Evidently for association of ideas 'attraction of ideas' should be substituted. The inductive term, "radiating," attaches itself to a system, and to that part of a system determined by the personal equation, time of life, environment, etc. Of the laws governing this 'attraction,' little can be said as yet. Quantitatively, "the value of attractions will be proportionate to the number and to the convergence of directions of various forces." Qualitatively, "two states that have already coexisted in consciousness so as to form two parts of the same systematic group, will tend to attract each other, thus establishing an analogous group, the strength of attraction varying as the coherence of the first group, and as the number of times the ideas have appeared united in the same system."

ARTHUR J. TIETJE.

Psychology on the 'New Thought' Movement. JOHN H. NOBLE. The Monist, XIV, 3, pp. 409–426.

In this article the author gives, without criticism, an account of the discussion of the 'New Thought' movement in Professor James's *Varieties* *of Religious Experience.* This movement is regarded by Professor James as belonging to the general tendency toward 'healthy-mindedness,' or a deliberately adopted attitude of optimism, which, in his opinion, is psychologically reasonable. The rapid spread of the 'New Thought' among the American people is due chiefly to its practical appeal. Its speculative side, which is the aspect of interest to psychology, rests on the same basis as does all religious experience, —the existence of a dual nature in man. All religions agree in the belief in a higher or spiritual nature in man, which is in direct relation to a Divine Order, and in the possibility of escape from evil by habitually living in harmony with this higher nature. The relation of the 'New Thought' to modern psychology is found in the identification of this higher nature with the subliminal consciousness. By relaxation, which is a practical recognition of the union of the higher self with the Universal Mind, the 'New Thought' asserts that it is possible to obtain divine help, and to gain a revelation of truth transcending ordinary knowledge. As a religious practice, this is not new, but is similar to 'conversion' and to various phenomena of mysticism found thoughout religious history. Psychologically, relaxation means a shift of the center of the field of consciousness, which allows subliminal processes, hitherto inhibited, to cross the threshold. An analogous experience is the recovery of a forgotten name, when the direct effort to recall it is relaxed. This attitude of relaxation, even if admitted to be merely a subjective condition, has marked effects upon action and endurance, and must hence be regarded as an important biological function. But while psychology affirms the existence of a subliminal consciousness, and emphasizes its importance as a factor in experience, it offers neither proof nor disproof of its relation to a Divine consciousness.

GRACE MEAD ANDRUS.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

La science positive de la morale. G. CANTECOR. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 3, pp. 225–241; 4, pp. 368–392.

The title of this article suggests one of the most interesting of recent movements, as represented by MM. Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim, Wundt, Bouglé, and Simmel. According to the first of these, morality is a political or pedagogical art, its object being society or the individual. But really this presupposes the true morality of which an account is to be given. Conflicting ends necessitate choice, and this, in turn, deliberation, a hierarchy of goods, a criterion of ends, and moral formulæ. The criterion is the concept of the *summum bonum*, the formulæ are the moral laws. Erroneous moral theory no more destroys obligation than an erroneous theory of light alters the retinal sensation. Since reason and instinct may conflict, moral rules, to have any validity, must be based on the acknowledged authority of reason to arbitrate in conduct. Traditional morality has only the appearance of real existence. All the moralists of a given age give practically the same precepts, yet the precepts of one age are not those of another. Even if the moral idea could be determined speculatively, this would not prove the resulting conception to be either practically applicable or obligatory ; abstract reason is as incapable of producing the form as the matter of morality. It is not abstract man, but men, to whom morality applies. Modern moral theory ascertains rather than constructs. Duty is only an abstraction, not a '*fact* of reason' ; theory and logic do not confer the character of reality or of obligation, any more than they alter the situation of an object or act. Moral laws are imposed upon individuals by the material and moral sanction of society. It is this sanction and not reason which gives birth to obligation. Thus an action is not obligatory because good, but good because obligatory. Duty is imposed by custom and social inertia. Tendency is not reason, yet psychology shows the former to be the source of action. The deliberative consciousness is concerned with means ; from it we learn, not what we must reasonably wish, but how to fulfill our (possibly irrational) inclinations. The conclusion that reason imposes an ideal upon us is falsely reached by arguing that we first desire a thing because it is beautiful, and then think it is beautiful because of the intensity of our desire. The scientific analysis of morality originated in German historicism and French positivism, in the absorption of the individual in society, and in the historical study of his rights. An intellectual and a social factor are here involved.

ANNIE D. MONTGOMERY.

The Coming Scientific Morality. GEORGE GORE. The Monist, XIV, 3, pp. 355-377.

Despite the apparent lack of relation between morality and the fundamental principles of mechanical science, the only permanent basis for morality and guide for human conduct are to be found in the principles of universal motion and universal causation. Evidence has shown that all bodies are in a state of constant internal motion involving conversion of energy. In man, this conversion of energy, particularly in its relation to similar action in other human beings and throughout the environment generally, produces, through the medium of the nervous system, consciousness and the phenomena of morality. Thus man's moral life is inexorably governed by material necessity, and the rate of human progress is as definitely fixed as the speed of the celestial bodies. Mind or soul is not a distinct entity, but is merely the collection of faculties termed consciousness, observation, comparison, etc. It is a species of life, which may in turn be defined as a kind of motion, viz., motion in organic structure. Wherever this exists, questions of morality arise. Moral and immoral acts are as much cases of cause and effect as is the motion of a steam-engine, and are apparently less certain only because more complex. Since all men act under compulsion, even in committing crime, they should not be held entirely responsible for such acts. 'Good' is that which serves some useful purpose, not merely to mankind but to the universe. 'Evil' is the unjustifiable infliction of pain or injury on sentient creatures. Pain in itself is not an evil, but is merely a sensation which is feared and disliked. The problem of evil, although complex, may be solved upon recourse to scientific principles. Viewed scientifically, the universe is seen to be perfect and to contain no evil. Pain, which is commonly called evil, may in every case ultimately be proved to be necessary to human welfare. This conclusion, would, if adopted and applied scientifically, relieve human suffering, for scientific knowledge is the greatest preventive of pain.

GRACE MEAD ANDRUS.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Saint-Simon, père du positivisme. G. DUMAS. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 2, pp. 136–157; 3, pp. 263–287.

There has been much controversy between the followers of Saint-Simon and the Comtists concerning the relation of Comte to Saint-Simon, the former holding that Comte was merely a disciple who had denied his master, the latter that Saint-Simon exercised no influence over the philosophy of Comte. The author takes the former position, and attempts to show that Saint-Simon had reached the general conception of Positivism before Comte, and that the relation of the two systems can be understood only in view of the personal relations of the two men. Comte met Saint-Simon in 1817, shortly after his expulsion from the École polytechnique. Attracted both by the personality of the older man and by the theories which Saint-Simon held even at that time, Comte fell under his influence and soon became his secretary and collaborator, a position which he occupied until 1825. Various letters written by Comte during this period not only attest his great admiration and friendship for Saint-Simon, but also acknowledge the latter's influence. During these years he wrote under his master's direction the third volume of *L'industrie*, and aided in the production of *La politique* and *L'organisation*. At the same time Comte also conceived and partly carried out a work whose aim was to systematize, according to Positive methods, all the sciences, including those of mind and society. While Saint-Simon's ignorance of the special sciences precluded the possibility of his influence on the details of this work, yet his general conception of a synthesis of the human sciences, which he had held as early as 1808, was undoubtedly known to Comte. For five years Comte published all his writings under the patronage of Saint-Simon, not even demanding the appearance of his name in connection with that of his master. In 1822 he refused to continue this. Instead of accepting Comte's refusal, Saint-Simon delayed the appearance of a part of *Le catechisme;* and, when he finally published it, incorporated in it some work of Comte's without recognition of his independent authorship. The breach between them was now complete, and from this time Comte's personal attitude toward Saint-Simon changed entirely. In letters written after this time, Comte speaks in the most slighting terms of his former master, and even denies absolutely that Saint-Simon had influenced his thought. The second article is devoted to a comparison of the systems of Saint-Simon and Comte. The end which Comte proposed to himself was the establishment of a unity of thought and feeling such as had been destroyed in the overthrow of the power of Catholicism. This he believed could only be accomplished by hastening the necessary course of human progress from the theological and metaphysical stages to the final positive stage. To this end, he attempted first a synthesis of all human knowledge in a hierarchy of sciences culminating in sociology. His next aim was the organization of separate spiritual and temporal powers. The spiritual organization he hoped to achieve through the establishment of the religion of Humanity, which was modelled in form and ceremonial on Catholicism. A central industrial power, organized under a system of district administration, was to control the economic life of Europe, and eventually that of the world. Toward the end of Comte's life, the influence of Clotilde de Vaux gave his thought a more mystical and religious character, and led to a greater insistence on the love and worship of humanity. The central aim of Saint-Simon was to put an end to the moral confusion, prevalent since the decline of theological beliefs, by organizing a new spiritual power. This he proposed to attain by a council of scholars called the Council of Newton, which should represent God upon earth, and divide Europe into districts for the administration of the new religion. He also believed it was necessary to construct a synthesis of human knowledge. At first he attempted this by tracing all phenomena, including those of life and society, to the law of gravitation, although he had realized the impossibility of this before his meeting with Comte. Like Comte, he believed that all knowledge must pass through two earlier stages to the final positive stage, and that the extension of the positive method to the science of man must precede other forms of progress. He approached Comte also in the incorporation in his new religion of the moral and social philosophy of Catholicism. He also proposed the organization of industry as a separate temporal power, which should be united to science as feudalism had been related to theological power. A further similarity to Comte is found in the emphasis placed by Saint-Simon in his later years on the religious sentiment, which he defined as love for humanity. From this examination of the theories of the two men, as well as from the facts of their personal relations, it seems impossible to deny that Comte, although he developed Positivism in a way impossible to Saint-Simon, nevertheless owed all his chief conceptions to the latter.

GRACE MEAD ANDRUS.

Professor Bain's Philosophy. WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON. Mind, 50, pp. 161–179.

Professor Bain's philosophy is a study of experience from the point of view of scientific psychology rather than of metaphysics. In his analysis and description of mental processes he started psychology on new lines of research by his strict use of the physiological method. He recognized three native capacities as the basis of acquisition. First, he assumed the spontaneity of the nervous system, producing random movements. These would be afterwards avoided or sought for, as they produced pain or pleasure. Secondly, he recognized the instincts as a class of native and useful endowments which become "primordial elements" in education. This is owing to the law of self-conservation, viz., 'that states of pleasure are connected with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement of some, or all, of the vital functions.' Finally, the mind has active powers of retention and discrimination in regard to sense-presentations. This activity of the mind leads to a statement of the law of relativity, so important in Professor Bain's system, viz., 'an object has no meaning without a subject, a subject none without an object.' The structure of the intellect is built up from the three elements mentioned above, by association. Professor Bain's use of the principle of association in explaining mind thoroughly did away with the treatment of it as composed of separate 'faculties.' In explaining the higher instincts he recognized the influence of heredity. Professor Bain attempted no strict classification of the emotions, but he made use of the physiological method of description. The will arises in the control of spontaneous random movements, under motives of pleasure and pain. Its growth from this primitive beginning is explained on the principle of association. The problem of the will's freedom Professor Bain regarded as a metaphysical puzzle of small importance. In ethics, Professor Bain was a utilitarian, but was peculiar in advocating the existence of disinterestedness in man uncontrolled by the ultimate tests of pleasure and pain. The moral sense he believed to be a unique emotion, developed only under the influence of education and authority. Conscience, in his system, was derivative and analyzable, but none the less valuable ethically for that. Idealistic ethics he thought visionary. His philosophy was practical, especially in its application to education. For the purpose of stimulating philosophical research in Great Britain he established *Mind*, and made it a success. It is striking testimony to his influence that much of his psychology has passed into the commonplaces of the science.

MARY WINIFRED SPRAGUE.